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ABSTRACT: Sperber and Mercier (2009, 2010) maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational  
module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the 
flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and  
epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss this definition of argumen-
tation by analyzing what they mean by “communicator’s persuasiveness” and “audience epistemic vigilance” 
KEYWORDS: argumentation, cognition, confirmation bias, Dan Sperber, evolution, psychology,  
reasoning, relevance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do humans reason?, is not a question scholars usually address or ask themselves 
very often in the study of argumentation. Why do humans reason?, is, nonetheless, the 
title of one of the main articles in which Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier propose a new 
theory of argumentation. The authors claim that while the question of how humans reason 
has been investigated thoroughly in many areas (from philosophy to rhetoric), not much 
has been said about why humans have this faculty, capacity or behaviour.
1
 The question 
of how has been answered from an evolutionary, cognitive and psychological perspective. 
By using some evidence—results of experiments of the last 40 years, principally in deci-
sion making and reasoning research—, they describe the psychological mechanisms that 
underlay the actual practices of individuals engaged in argumentative scenarios (confir-
mation bias, polarization, motivated reasoning, among other mechanisms). As will be 
discussed later, Sperber and Mercier propose a definition of argumentation and offer a set 
of core terms by which, in their opinion, this faculty could be understood better.  
 The authors reverse the common approach to the phenomenon by entitling their 
theory “The argumentative theory of reasoning”. For Sperber et al (2010: 383), argumen-
tation is a product of reasoning, whereas reasoning (seen as reflective inferences) is a 
mental module whose function is to produce and evaluate arguments. Sperber and Mer-
cier point out:  
                                                 
1
  From the perspective of evolution theory, Desalles (2007) is perhaps one of the exceptions to this generalization. 
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Reasoning can be defined as the ability to produce and evaluate reasons. It is a costly ability: it 
involves special metarepresentational capacities found only among humans, it needs practice to 
reach proficiency, and exerting it is relatively slow and effortful. Reasoning, we argue, evolved 
because of its contribution to the effectiveness of human communication, enhancing content-
based epistemic vigilance and one’s ability to persuade a vigilant audience. The reasons reason-
ing is primarily about are not solipsistic, they are not for private appreciation, they are argu-
ments used, or at least rehearsed, for persuading others. Sperber and Mercier (in press: 19)
2
 
In this “evolutionary-narrative” fashion, Mercier and Landemore (in press, 6) add that 
“Contrary to classical cognitive theories, which only provide one level of explanation, 
that of mechanistic, or proximal (sensu Tinbergen 1963) explanations, the theory deline-
ated... is an evolutionary theory of reasoning. It argues that reasoning evolved for a spe-
cific function—argumentation—that provides a deeper explanation of reasoning’s ob-
served features and pattern of performance.” In other words, argumentation would be an 
outcome of reasoning only if it is socially localized. 
 What is interesting from a standard approach to argumentation is that this new 
theory overlaps, for example, with the pragma-dialectician definition of argumentation as a 
social activity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 1), and also with Toulmin, Rieke and 
Janik’s (1979: 13) general definition of argumentation as an activity of making claims, 
“challenging them, backing them up by producing reasons”. But, apart from this prelimi-
nary and basic coincidence, Sperber and Mercier’s angle demystifies many of our assump-
tions or definitions and it directly challenges our politically correct positions—such as 
Johnson’s (2000: 26-7) list of benefits of practicing argumentation. Certainly, this approach 
does not take into account many important basic features of argumentation, such as that ar-
gumentation is a commitment-based activity (Walton and Krabbe 1995; Walton, 2007: 50). 
 Given the novelty of this angle (the core publications are still in press!), and es-
pecially because OSSA is devoted to the relationship between cognition and argumenta-
tion this year, in what follows I will discuss Sperber and Mercier’s cognitive theory in 
order to see in which ways this new approach could improve our current vision of argu-
mentation or, otherwise, make us aware of the misunderstandings. 
2. ARGUMENTATION IN TWO MINDS 
In his earliest writings on this issue, Sperber (2001: 410) claimed that the function of  
argumentation 
... is linked to communication rather than to individual cognition. It is to help audiences  
decide what messages to accept, and to help communicators produce messages that will be 
accepted. It is an evaluation and persuasion mechanism, not, or at least not directly, a 
knowledge production mechanism”.  
In his last co-authored publications (Mercier and Sperber, in press; Mercier and Sperber, 
forthcoming; Mercier and Landemore, in press), argumentation is incessantly presented 
as a dimension that does not improve cognitive skills and only as a side-effect provides 
some gains for individuals. The explanation begins by claiming that human thinking is 
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  Unless stated to the contrary, all the quotes come from manuscripts of the authors available on their 
website. For example: http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/. Although the authors explicitly point 
out that these versions are not to be quoted, here the original number pagination is used. 
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not a homogeneous process governed by intelligence and limited by passions (see also 
Berthoz, 2009). As empirical research in cognitive psychology has shown—Sperber and 
Mercier (in press: 2) go on and on about it—, human thinking is a weak mechanism 
through which humans have conscious access to thought-processes. Reason and intelli-
gence can not refer to any unified process in the mind and, in fact, reason and intelligence 
are reflected in the coordination or co-function of many modules (see Sperber and Hirsch-
feld (2007) for a defence of a modularity view of mind).
3
 Some of these modules can even 
pertain to one of the two systems of the mind, a division that cognitive psychologists have 
proposed (see Evans and Frankish (2009) for an update compilation on the issue). 
 Under the hypothesis of the mind being composed of two systems, the ability of 
argumentation (reflective inferences or reasoning proper) is, at first glance, a manifesta-
tion of system 2. Mercier (forthcoming, d: 3) points out that “‘reasoning’ will be used to 
refer only to what is usually called system 2, analytic or rule-based reasoning”. The lit-
erature on the topic (Frankish and Evans 2009: 15) has agreed that system 1 is evolution-
arily old, unconscious or preconscious, shared with animals, managing implicit 
knowledge, automatic, fast, parallel, with high capacity, intuitive, contextualized, prag-
matic, associative, and independent of general intelligence; system 2 is characterized as 
evolutionarily recent, conscious, distinctive of humans, managing explicit knowledge, 
controlled, slow, sequential, low capacity, reflective, abstract, logical, rule-based, and 
linked to general intelligence.  
 One consequence of placing argumentation under this umbrella (mind as a dual 
system-modularity architecture) is that this ability is seen as a meta-representational 
mechanism that, ultimately, is the result of an intuitive multi-unaware mental process. 
Mercier and Sperber (forthcoming) try to explain the steps from intuitive inference to rea-
soning/argumentation proper by combining many concepts and theories in the fields of 
cognition and evolution: 
A process of inference is a process the representational output of which necessarily or proba-
bilistically follows from its representational input. The function of an inferential process is to 
augment and correct the information available to the cognitive system. An evolutionary  
approach suggests that inferential processes, rather than being based on a single inferential 
mechanism or constituting a single integrated ‘system’, are much more likely to be performed 
by a variety of domain-specific mechanisms, each attuned to the specific demands and  
affordances of its domain (see, e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). The inferential  
processes carried out by these mechanisms are unconscious: they are not mental acts that in-
dividuals decide to perform, but processes that take place inside their brain, at a “sub-
personal” level (in the sense of Dennett, 1969). People may be aware of having reached a  
certain conclusion, be aware, that is, of the output of an inferential process, but we claim that 
they are never aware of the process itself. All inferences carried out by inferential  
mechanisms are in this sense ‘intuitive’. They generate ‘intuitive beliefs’ that is beliefs held 
without awareness of reasons to hold them. (Mercier and Sperber forthcoming: 5-6) 
                                                 
3
  Sperber and Hirschfeld (2007: 157) boldly maintain that “According to the massive modularity hypoth-
esis (see Carruthers 2003; Cosmides & Tooby 1994; Samuels 1998, 2000; Sperber 1996, 2001), the 
mind is to a large extent made up of a variety of domain- or task-specific cognitive mechanisms or 
“modules”. It might seem that massive modularity would imply a level of cognitive rigidity hardly 
compatible with cultural diversity. We want to argue, on the contrary, that massive modularity properly 
understood is a crucial component in the explanation of this diversity”. For a more balanced account of 
the role of the modularity hypothesis in mind and language, see Carey (2009). 
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They continue by adding that the difference between inference and argument relies on the 
explicitness of the reasons that support a given conclusion in the case of argument: 
Arguments should be sharply distinguished from inferences. An inference is a process the 
output of which is a representation. An argument is a complex representation. Both an infer-
ence and an argument have what can be called a conclusion, but in the case of an inference, 
the conclusion is the output of the inference; in the case of an argument, the conclusion is a 
part—typically the last part—of the representation. The output of an inference can be called a 
‘conclusion’ because what characterizes an inferential process is that its output is justified by 
its input; the way however in which the input justifies the output is not represented in the 
output of an intuitive inference. What makes the conclusion of an argument a ‘conclusion’ 
(rather than simply a proposition) is the fact that the reasons for drawing this conclusion on 
the basis of the premises are (at least partially) spelled out. As Gilbert Harman has justly ar-
gued (Harman, 1986), it is a common but costly mistake to confuse the causally and tempo-
rally related steps of an inference with the logically related steps of an argument.  
(Mercier and Sperber forthcoming: 7). 
The authors sympathize with various frameworks, and this usually leaves the promoters 
at the edge of a cliff, for instance, when they go back to system 1 of the mind—perhaps 
to maintain the evolutionary mainstream narrative. One gets the idea that this is done like 
this in order to explain the elaboration of a reflective mechanism: arguments are intui-
tions about the relationship between reasons and conclusions. They assert:  
… all arguments must ultimately be grounded in intuitive judgments that given conclusions 
follow from given premises. In other words, we are suggesting that arguments are not the 
output of a ‘system 2’ mechanism for explicit reasoning, that would be standing apart from, 
and in symmetrical contrast to, a ‘system 1’ mechanism for intuitive inference. Rather,  
arguments are the output of one mechanism of intuitive inference among many that delivers 
intuitions about premise-conclusion relationships. Intuitions about arguments have an evalua-
tive component: Some arguments are seen as strong, others as weak. Moreover there may be 
competing arguments for opposite conclusions and we may intuitively prefer one to another. 
These evaluation and preferences are ultimately grounded in intuition.  
(Mercier and Sperber forthcoming: 8) 
What is salient from these quotes is that by framing argumentation in this way, they pre-
pare the ground for the introduction of the core explanation: arguments are complex-
reflective inferences only if, at least partially, the representations (reasons) are spelled 
out, this is to say, when the environment—the audience—requires some kind of refine-
ment of the information presented. They explain: 
Here we want to explore the idea that the emergence of reasoning is best understood within 
the framework of the evolution of human communication. Reasoning allows people to  
exchange arguments that, on the whole, make communication more reliable and hence more 
advantageous. The main function of reasoning, we claim, is argumentative (Sperber, 2000a, 
2001, see also Billig, 1996; Dessalles, 2007; Kuhn, 1992; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1969; Haidt, 2001, and Gibbard, 1990, offer a very similar take on the special case of moral 
reasoning). (Mercier and Sperber forthcoming: 11) 
By argumentative they mean that reasoning is situated in a dialogue, in a social context, 
in which individuals—and only because of this public condition—ponder on reasons, 
even anticipate scenarios, to affect someone’s thoughts or actions (from the point of view 
of the communicators) and to filter information that could derail us (from the point of 
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view of the audience). The hart of the proposal, once the basic evolutionary intersection 
between the mind and the social is explained, would be that the principal argumentative 
profile of reasoning serves human communication purposes. This practice improves or 
increases “both in quantity and in epistemic quality the information humans are able to 
share” (Mercier and Sperber forthcoming: 50).  
 Humans are good in arguing, although rarely, according to the authors—quoting 
empirical research—engage in high-order reasoning, this is, pondering reasons about rea-
sons. In fact, what this theory challenges is that humans take good decisions, maintaining 
that they prefer to take decisions they can justify more easily in front others.
4
 The empiri-
cal research quoted by the authors—which is constantly repeated—allows them to say 
that reasoning is not a higher form of individual cognition, but is better used in collabora-
tive behaviour, because there it produces better outcomes.
5
 Collaboration in this context 
means no constriction on weighing reasons.  
 In “Reasoning as a Social Competence”, Sperber and Mercier summarize many 
of the aspects commented on: 
Reasoning, we have argued, is a specialized metarepresentational competence with a primari-
ly social cognitive function. It is both structurally and functionally quite different from  
intuitive inferential mechanisms that have a primarily individual cognitive function. Collec-
tive cognitive performance may be based on the aggregation of individual intuitions or on  
argumentative interaction, with quite different outcomes...When argumentation and hence 
reasoning are at work, they shape the outcomes of group processes. In many cases, this is for 
the best—more information is shared, superior arguments are granted more weight. Some-
times, however, reasoning creates a polarization of the group (Sunstein 2002). This mostly 
happens when people are forced to debate an issue on which they already agree.  
(Sperber and Mercier in press: 22-3) 
Thus, this approach emphasizes that reasoning is a mental act of constructing or evaluat-
ing an argument, which is in contrast with ordinary intuitive inference—a process that 
yields a conclusion without articulating the reason to accept it. The authors argue that the 
main function of reasoning is social, but it serves the social interests of individuals rather 
than the collective interests of the group. This is shown by the fact that people produce 
arguments within a “high degree of mere satisficing”, this is to say—and academic and 
intellectual contexts aside –, people do not look for the best formulation of the best argu-
ment possible, instead people use the first minimally decent argument, and if the argu-
ment does not work then a rebuttal or another argument is put forward.    
 As soon as the paper Why do human reason? circulated, scholars critically as-
sessed it by putting forward important objections. Mercier and Sperber (forthcoming) 
mention that the most irritating objection that they really want to correct is that their theo-
ry of reasoning has only rhetorical goals: accordingly, that reasoning is only designed to 
find arguments to persuade others. On the contrary, Mercier and Sperber think that rea-
                                                 
4
  Mercier and Sperber (forthcoming: 42-3) point out: “According to this theory, people often make deci-
sions because they can find reasons to support them. These reasons will not favour the best decisions, or 
decisions that satisfy some criterion of rationality, but decisions that can be easily justified and are less 
at risk of being criticized.” 
5 
 Nevertheless, the authors rapidly point out that “… it should be stressed that the argumentative theory 
does not predict that groups will always make better decisions, but merely that reasoning should work 
better in the context of a genuine debate” (Mercier and Sperber, forthcoming: 14) 
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soning evolved in part to make people change their mind by presenting them good rea-
sons to do so. But then the question is: what kind of theoretical explanation could balance 
the idea that reasoning evolved also with epistemic goals—the inclination to give good 
reasons—and, at the same time, that people make a minimal effort to put forward good 
arguments and that audiences, more time than less, accept these decent arguments instead 
of only the best ones? 
3. EPISTEMIC VIGILANCE: THE WARRIOR METAPHOR 
The authors believe that the misinterpretation of their theory is due to the wrongly over-
emphasised role of communicators by the critics—the role of the communicators being to 
produce arguments to persuade—, instead of seeing the role of the audience, which is to 
evaluate arguments to choose those that yield useful information. 
 If reasoning as an argumentative practice is performed by individuals by means 
of minimal cognitive efforts because it is a high-cost mental activity with a relatively 
high failure rate, then why does reasoning as an argumentative practice exist at all? The 
answer of the authors is: 
Humans are immersed in a flow of socially transmitted information and are highly dependent 
on it. For communication to have evolved, it had to be advantageous to both communicators 
and receivers... What makes communications advantageous to receivers is that it provides 
them with rich information that they could not, or not easily, have obtained on their own. For 
this, the information they receive has to be genuine information, that is, close enough to the 
truth. What makes communication adventurous to communicators is that it allows them to 
achieve some desirable effect in the receivers. For this, the information they emit has to be 
conducive to this effect, whether it is true or false (Mercier and Sperber, forthcoming: 5) 
Because receivers have to be alert in order to avoid misleading information, they must 
exercise what Sperber et al (2010) call “epistemic vigilance”. This is not a slogan of the 
“War on Terror”, but the concept by which the authors stress the active role of the audi-
ence in the practice of argumentation. Specifically, epistemic vigilance, apparently, is a 
cognitive skill to filter the information carried out by three heuristic mechanisms or strat-
egies: assessing the trustworthiness of the communicators, checking the coherence of the 
message—considered here as the encyclopaedic knowledge of the audience–, and as-
sessing the relevance of the message (although relevance seems to be, for Sperber et al 
(2010: 376), only a step in the checking-coherence process).  
 By assessing the trustworthiness of the communicators, the authors simply mean 
that receivers automatically calibrate the level of trust of the source of the message (Didn’t 
Cicero say something very important about this two thousand years ago?) By checking co-
herence, they mean the degree of believability of the information received, the higher de-
gree is, in turn, obtained by the audience through pressure on the communicators by asking 
them to display more adequate arguments for the discussion or arguments at hand. In the 
Sperber’s (2001) evolutionary terms, the idea is clarified in the following narrative: 
EVOLUTION, COGNITION AND ARGUMENTATION 
7 
My first suggestion is this: coherence checking—which involves metarepresentational atten-
tion to logical and evidential relationships between representations—evolved as a means of 
reaping the benefits of communication while limiting its costs. It originated as a defense 
against the risks of deception. This, however, was just the first step in an evolutionary arms 
race between communicators and audiences (who are of course the same people, but play-
ing—and relying more or less on—two different roles). (Sperber 2001:409) 
Obviously, when trust is in doubt, communicators lay more stress on the contents of the 
messages—they commit themselves to utter more coherence-based reasons for the ac-
ceptance of a given message; at the same time, smart audiences should balance the relia-
bility of the source with the believability of the content.  
 Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995) is an omnipresent mechanism through 
which certain deductive protocols are activated to interpret the message in a more produc-
tive way. This does not mean that hearers tend to search for a charitable interpretation; 
relevance is more or less an asymmetrically proportional measure: when the costs of 
searching for the right interpretation are too high, then the cognitive effects tend to go 
down and, for this reason, hearers could abort the mission of searching. In argumentative 
scenarios, when a piece of information has little relevance or is directly irrelevant, and 
thus the presumption of relevance is interrupted, then hearers are pushed towards a sharp-
er epistemic vigilance stance. In other words, in contrast to the basic assumption among 
argumentation scholars, this idea goes against the principle of charity (for a comprehen-
sive account of this principle in argumentation theory, see Govier 1987)
6
. The principle 
of charity states that it would be unfair or unkind to arguers to give their discourse any-
thing less than a maximally sympathetic interpretation, because we are, in one way or an-
other, morally obligated to be charitable. For Sperber et al. (2010), this behaviour is un-
natural: unless we are in very specific settings—teaching kids, critical moments, or ex-
treme situations –, people tend to avoid high-cost interpretative reconstructions. 
 Reasoning is a tool for epistemic vigilance. It is the “verbalization” (with special 
constructions such as “if... then...”, “therefore”, etc.) of a sophisticated defence that filters 
unclear, incomplete, tricky, misleading, or even abusive discursive communication and 
information. Because plain cooperation, for Sperber et al. (2010), is not necessarily the 
norm among members of groups, individuals had to develop, from an evolutionary point 
of view, a kind of epistemic protection.  
 If we follow the metaphoric-semantic consistence, one could ask: to which ex-
tent is this protection or vigilance manifested in “preventive attacks”? The authors do not 
say. In other words: in argumentative scenarios, asking for clarification, to counter-argue, 
or to put forward doubts are more than passive mechanisms which the simple idea of 
vigilance seems to convey. For this precise reason, normative argumentation theories 
have developed standards for a reasonable discussion, critical discussion, and so on; and 
for this very basic reason, rhetoric has shown the ways in which persuasion takes place in 
important social affairs, when power, interests, games of predominance, and a long list of 
human inclinations, are part of extremely calculated exchanges. Audiences are not only in 
a vigilant stance when they hear a discourse; they are already in the discourse itself, due 
to the way the message is composed. In many occasions, audiences are co-responsible for 
what the communicators express. 
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 In this account, Govier (1987: 148) defends, nevertheless, a moderate version of charity. 
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3. CONFIRMATION BIAS 
The premise for the authors of the argumentative theory of reasoning is that reasoning 
evolved in such a way that we can argue with others to determine the weight of infor-
mation for our daily tasks. This activity, in return, makes us good at doing just that: argu-
ing. According to Mercier and Sperber, in real and truly argumentative scenarios, people 
are good at finding and evaluating arguments, and bad at artificial settings in which we 
ask for the resolution of reasoning problems. At the same, if reasoning is indeed a mech-
anism to argue collectively, then group performance is better than individual performanc-
es. Groups argue even better than the best individual of the group. Finally, this theory 
maintains, if reasoning evolved so we can argue with others, then we should be biased in 
our search for arguments: in a discussion, we tend not to use the arguments that rebut our 
claims. As the literature in the areas of judgment and decision making in psychology calls 
it, we proudly stand in this world showing our confirmation bias. 
 As the authors have repeated incessantly (Mercier, a; b; c; d; in press; Mercier 
and Landemore, in press; Mercier and Sperber, in press; forthcoming; Sperber and Mer-
cier, forthcoming), the confirmation bias’s heuristic disposition is the most robust and 
prevalent in reasoning. Confirmation bias is usually indicated as being responsible for 
much of our mischief. What is biased, nonetheless, is the production of arguments, not 
the evaluation. Surprisingly, for Sperber and Mercier, confirmation bias can be seen also 
as a sort of “division of cognitive labour” in the activity of arguing, because by using this 
bias it would not be necessary for all those involved in the discussion to laboriously as-
sess the pros and cons of each option under scrutiny. Again, does the emphasis on con-
firmation bias in this theory not challenge basic assumptions in standard approaches to 
argumentation? It is not possible to claim that OSSA and ISSA’s scholars are not aware 
of this line of research, but simply that it has not yet been considered.
7
  
 In short, in natural settings, when people reason they do not try to produce the 
best answer to a given rebuttal, but try to find confirmatory arguments that maintain their 
beliefs. Because confirmation bias does not stem from the ability of grasping falsifica-
tion, as part of the evaluation process, then this bias is, more or less, in perfect balance 
with the need for openness to cons. When we are in the position of evaluating arguments, 
we are guided, or incented, by the urge to keep valuable information and, for this reason, 
we even accept those arguments that force us to revise our beliefs. In genuine delibera-
tions, the confirmation bias of each individual is checked, “compensated by the confirma-
tion bias of individuals who defend another position. When no other opinion is present 
(or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically ex-
amine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion.” 
(Mercier and Landemore, in press: 22). Sperber and Mercier (in press) add: 
                                                 
7
  As a matter of fact, unless my review is incomplete, in the proceedings of both of the last conferences it 
is difficult to find a paper in which all these topics are addressed from a cognitive or an evolutionary 
point of view.  
EVOLUTION, COGNITION AND ARGUMENTATION 
9 
Is the confirmation bias therefore an aspect of reasoning that may be effective from a practi-
cal point of view but that makes reasoning epistemically defective? Not really. People are 
quite able to falsify ideas or hypotheses… when they disagree with them. When a hypothesis 
is presented by someone else, participants are much more likely to look for falsifying evi-
dence (Cowley & Byrne, 2005). When, for instance, people disagree with the conditional 
statement to be tested in the Wason selection task, a majority is able to pick the cards that can 
effectively falsify the statement, thereby successfully solving the task (Dawson, Gilovich, & 
Regan, 2002). Similarly, when people believe that the conclusion of a syllogism is false—if it 
conflicts with their beliefs for instance—they look for counterexamples, something they fail 
to do otherwise (Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). (Sperber and Mercier, in press: 22)  
Confirmation bias, unfortunately, is something that people can not suppress just like that. 
Reasoning, in this sense, has evolved in a way that makes its containers solipsistic ma-
chines, unless we are in group. Only this setting would make epistemic benefits possible. 
Interestingly, Mercier (a: 1) remembers that “If argument quality is not sufficiently high 
in a domain, the confirmation bias will make experts tap into their vast knowledge to de-
fend whatever opinion they hold, with polarization and overconfidence as expected re-
sults.” Everyone, perhaps, has experienced discussions with very knowledgeable people 
who generate more arguments but, at the same time, generate less contrary arguments. 
4. CONCLUSION  
So far, I have only examined how challenging this theory could be to standard approaches 
to argumentation, but not many specific questions have been proposed. In what follows, I 
will, unfortunately, not add much, only a few proto-critiques will be discussed. 
 As always is the case when summarizing and discussing—new—theories in 
short essays, it is easy to be unfair to the creators. Many interesting insights are left aside. 
One of these insights in the development of “the argumentative theory of reasoning” is 
that the authors problematize the idea of constructing categories of arguments. The sim-
ple question is: Is it possible to have the category “good argument” as, for example, the 
category “good restaurant”?  
 In a way, this reflection of the authors goes against classic rhetoricians. They 
agree that rhetoric has developed useful classifications in order to undress strategies (a 
very classic and old idea of rhetoric!), but for them it is not clear in which ways this could 
help people to look for arguments in daily life. When people want to find a good restau-
rant, then the categories “Japanese restaurant”, “Italian restaurant” or “French restaurant”, 
are rather irrelevant. Depending on the topic, context and interlocutors, any representa-
tion could be a good or bad argument (or even not an argument at all). In the case of a 
restaurant, many things come to your help, for example the architecture of the city in 
which you are looking for the restaurant (knowing that in some areas there are plenty of 
good restaurants), which could make your search easier, but are our minds organized in 
the same helpful way?   
 Another point of critique, as was discussed earlier, is the notion of “epistemic 
vigilance”. According to the definition, it is a cognitive “filter” that automatically pro-
tects hearers. Reasoning (as reflective inferences) was defined as a social device, whose 
main function is argumentative, this is to say, a mechanism that is “turned on” as soon as 
we open our mouth, but contrarily “epistemic vigilance” is at work all the time, as a heu-
ristic—fast—device that allows individuals to distinguish between valuable and poor in-
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formation, thus, is “epistemic vigilance” part of system 1 or system 2? Does “epistemic 
vigilance” promote individual epistemic benefits instead of collective interests? When we 
are in mediation or negotiations we often put our, say, local epistemic vigilance on 
“stand-by” to obtain a broader goal, this is to say, the vigilance is perhaps a matter of de-
gree and strategy. After all, epistemic vigilance does not need to be verbalized, we can 
stay silent forever in a very “sharp vigilant position.”  
 In my view, another problematic point is the notion of information. Because the 
angle of the authors is cognitive and psychological about the nature of human communica-
tion, information is a core concept. But when we argue, are we really sharing information? 
All depends, finally, on the notion of information that we have at hand. When discussing 
whether to walk or take the bus to the cinema, someone says: it is a beautiful day today!, 
implying that they should walk, is this information—in Eco’s sense as something that adds 
a fact that the other party did not know—or does the exclamation only convey the commu-
nicative intention of the communicator and nothing of the external world? The authors 
could reply that this is precisely the information sent: the communicative intention. But 
again, then we go into the game of second or higher order informational processes. 
 When the authors discuss the idea that “better outcomes” are reached in “normal 
deliberative conditions”, neither of these notions are clear. If they reject the very concept 
of a “good argument”, what kind of standards can be referred to, to decide whether a 
good final argument has been posed? They just emphasize that deliberating in groups al-
lows people to reach “epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic sta-
tus”. Mercier (a: 6) boldly points out: “Here I will have recourse to a more rudimentary 
yardstick: a good argument is one that is accepted by many people who can understand it 
and make the effort of evaluating it. Obviously, an argument can be accepted by many 
people, at a given time, and still be wrong. However, this outcome becomes less likely as 
the diversity of people who accept it increases”. Because I really do not want to forget my 
poor critical potential, I could ask: what do you mean by “diversity of people”? 
 The mere idea of abandoning individuality appears counter-intuitive, we either 
preserve the dimension or not. They point out that “... A distinctive feature of our ap-
proach, relevant to the discussion of ‘collective wisdom’, is the claim that the main func-
tion of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interper-
sonal communication (rather than to help individual ratiocination).” (Sperber and Mer-
cier, in press: 5). Certainly, in a collective situation all the participants receive the bene-
fits of putting in balance pros and cons of a given argumentation, but did not Robinson 
Crusoe entertain his brain by imagining worlds until Friday showed up? If we insist that 
the most important for our very nature is the social condition, which I believe following 
Tomasello (2008; Tomasello et al 2010), then even intuitive inferences are the product of 
the same social condition. 
 They say “Reasoning is specifically human. It is clearly linked to language” 
(Sperber and Mercier in press: 12). “Clearly linked to language” is not enough, because 
as far as we know, language is also specifically human, and evolved to make communica-
tion more efficient (see Macneilage 2008). Do reasoning and language then have the 
same function? Because we can represent and verbalize we can argue? Certainly, my 
young daughter, who does not talk properly yet, can manifest her disagreement with my 
orders, but I can not say that she is having a discussion with me.  
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 In the same vein, Mercier (a: 4) points out that “Cooperation is made more effi-
cient by communication, which in turn is facilitated by the exchange of arguments. Rea-
soning would have evolved to enable this exchange of arguments”. There is no space here 
to detail my concern, but I think it is totally the other way round (see Tomasello 2008: 
105; Tomasello et al, 2010), cooperation is a superstructure that made possible many of 
our cognitive skills and, certainly, the linguistic recursive faculty as much as the shared 
human intentionality. 
 A final epistemological remark is that they assume a very classic critical and ra-
tionalistic Popperian way of building a theory: “Our definition of reasoning may be debata-
ble, but the argumentative approach to reasoning is about reasoning as we defined it. To 
object to this definition, it is not enough to offer another definition that may be reasonable 
and useful. What would have to be shown is that ours fails to identify a phenomenon with 
enough autonomy and integrity to be a proper object of study and insight” (Mercier and 
Sperber, forthcoming: 4), this is to say, they want to be falsified. But, how to find and ac-
cept a—good—argument if this is mostly achieved by a few and not very diverse people? 
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The following  passage appeared in the Toronto Globe & Mail on 8 May 2011. 
In their new paper, ‘Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory’ 
(just published in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences), cognitive scientists Dan Sper-
ber and Hugo Mercier propose a new account of the origins of reasoning,” The Boston Globe 
reports. “Reasoning, they argue, actually didn’t evolve to help us find the truth; it evolved to 
help us make, win and evaluate arguments. … ‘The emergence of reasoning,’ they argue, ‘is 
best understood within the framework of the evolution of human communication.’ We don’t 
need reasons to think, but to explain our thoughts to other people, especially to people who 
have no particular reason to trust us. In fact, even when we reason quietly, in our own heads, 
we do so ‘anticipating a dialogic context.’ (Kesterton) 
The column in which it appeared is a collection of “facts,” oddities, and bits of social 
information. Since this is an indication of potential interest in this view, it is timely that 
Cristián Santibañez undertakes a review of this theory in his paper “Evolution, Cognition 
and Argumentation.” Santibañez explains that his goal in this essay is to, “discuss Sper-
ber and Mercier’s cognitive theory in order to see in which ways this new approach could 
improve our current vision of argumentation or, otherwise, make us aware of the misun-
derstandings” (1). The view in question is an evolutionary approach which distinguishes, 
first, between internal inferential thinking, and, secondly, public argumentation. The for-
mer is intuitive and proceeds out of awareness, while the latter is essentially a product of 
disagreement which calls for defence, critique and attack.  
 The vast majority of beliefs and values we hold are never questioned or openly 
defended. For the great majority of people, i.e., virtually all non-philosophers, there is no 
reason to reflect on a belief unless it is questioned or attacked. While on the one hand we 
always believe people have reasons for their beliefs, those reasons are almost never 
brought forward unless that belief is under fire or question (Gilbert 2008, 27). In that 
case, argument enters the picture, and argument for that reason is always, at least in its 
natural state, public. This is the so-called system 2, as opposed to system 1, which is 
much more primitive. Santibañez explains it as follows. 
…system 1 is evolutionarily old, unconscious or preconscious, shared with animals, manag-
ing implicit knowledge, automatic, fast, parallel, with high capacity, intuitive, contextualized, 
pragmatic, associative, and independent of general intelligence; system 2 is characterized as 
evolutionarily recent, conscious, distinctive of humans, managing explicit knowledge, con-
trolled, slow, sequential, low capacity, reflective, abstract, logical, rule-based, and linked to 
general intelligence. (p. 3) 
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So the lizard brain keeps us chugging along, prevents us from trying to walk on water or 
tackle mastodons one on one. Mind you, much of that is communicated via learning from 
others of our species, and even from observing other species. There was never (or rarely), 
after all, a single isolated non-social human being, so how can we separate with such con-
fidence that which is private and intuitive from that which is public and reasoned. I sus-
pect that there is much more interaction between these levels than might be thought. 
 Santibañez quotes M&S as saying, “Reasoning allows people to exchange argu-
ments that, on the whole, make communication more reliable and hence more advanta-
geous” (in press, pp. 22 f.). This strikes me as presumptuous. Just the morning of this 
writing, I was listening to CBC-One while a gentleman explained that the world is going 
to end on 21 May. Apparently, he is not alone in this belief, and there are some serious 
number of adherents to this prophecy. While being interviewed he made arguments, all 
with full biblical references, that he used to shore up his case. Clearly, he is a total cuck-
oo-bird, and if, indeed, I am standing here in Windsor addressing an audience, then he 
was wrong. (As, indeed, we discovered.) Yet the arguments going back and forth were 
certainly not making communication “more reliable.” Instead, the façade of argument, 
the veneer or argumentative language lent support to his conviction and his ability to per-
suade others. Santibañez also raises this question, and wonders how, if they are right, we 
do not always insist on good arguments rather than less than perfect ones. 
 Santibañez quote M&S again, “For communication to have evolved, it had to be 
advantageous to both communicators and receivers” (Mercier and Sperber, forthcoming: 
5). Yet the skill level of individuals who communicate is widely diverse, as is their un-
derstanding of the purpose and function of communication and argument (O'Keefe 1995). 
Communication, and most certainly argumentation, is not a homogeneous ability, but a 
skill that can be learned and trained. Consequently, if it is “advantageous to both commu-
nicators and receivers” then it is not equally so.  
 Santibañez raises the issue of “epistemic vigilance,” which he describes as the 
cognitive skill used to filter information according to what looks a bit like the RSA com-
bination of Johnson & Blair (1993). As described by M&S, this appears to be a more or 
less passive “watching” activity, but Santibañez doubts it is such a thing. The audience, 
he points out, is “already in the discourse itself,” and this means they are involved in cre-
ating the message[s], at the very least, in a Gricean way. Moreover, we can go further: 
even when addressing in “real argumentative situations,” the speaker is not addressing 
one coherent, homogeneous whole. Rather, it is an audience composed of individuals 
who may share a set of values, beliefs, etc., but will also vary from individual to individ-
ual. Ultimately, each audience consists of an individual.  
 Santibañez also points out that the proposed view fails to recognize different kinds 
of argumentation. He specifically mentions negotiation, but there are other contexts as well 
where we deviate or vary from the sort of model they propose. Inquiry, for example, may 
violate the essential idea that argument is based on an agreement/disagreement dichotomy 
in a way similar to negotiation. We may be working together to form the best opinion or 
construct the best plan, without having much idea in advance of where we are going.  
 This adds weight to Santibañez’s criticism that the notion of “normal delibera-
tive conditions” is unclear (p. 6). Mercier is quoted by Santibañez as holding that a “good 
argument” is one that is widely accepted, and says, “Obviously, an argument can be ac-
cepted by many people, at a given time, and still be wrong” (Mercier a: 6). What is not at 
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all clear is just what is wrong – is it the argument itself, or the claim that results from the 
argument. If the former, what does that mean? What standard is being used? “Wrong” is 
not a normal predicate for an argument as is, say, “valid” or “strong.” Mercier mirrors 
Perelman in saying that the more diverse the audience that accepts an argument the more 
right it is likely to be, but as Santibañez points out, this isn’t really explained.  
 Santibañez questions whether the public and community centred communication 
they believe is central to argumentation, can apply solely to that, and not to intuitive in-
ferences as well. This is a key point, and I anticipated it above. I certainly agree that ar-
gumentation and communication must happen in public contexts in order to be learned 
and practiced. We know more and more that group-think, when properly conducted has 
the potential to open up ideas, expose flaws, and encourage new thinking. Yes, we have a 
more than slight tendency to adhere to our existing views, but the context can often lead 
us to be more open (as for example, in this meeting.) However, what might allow us to 
assume that intuitional inference exists independently from externalized arguments? In 
other words, while some primitive reasoning or inferential patterns certainly exist (avoid 
pain and danger, satisfy basic needs,) the sophistication of this activity must surely come 
from the interaction of public/private reasoning.  
 I now want to turn to a different point, and one that underlies the premise of the 
evolutionary approach. Saying that something is evolutionary is to say that it has come 
about because it has helped the species grow and thrive. Santibañez quotes Mercier (in 
press: 19): “Reasoning, we argue, evolved because of its contribution to the effectiveness 
of human communication.” I would like to briefly consider this. 
 First of all, I admit to having a tendency to think of evolutionary explanations as 
inherently post hoc. We look at something and want to explain it, so we figure out how it 
helps and/or protects the species. We have two eyes rather than one because it is helpful 
to be able to judge distances. Indeed, this may explain why we have two eyes rather than 
one, but it does not explain why we don’t have one eye capable of judging distance or a 
third eye to make it all even better. Why not five eyes so that if something happened to 
one, then the other would be able to fill in? The problem, in short, is the supposition that 
what occurs can be explained through an evolutionary story based on the fact that it ex-
ists. Argument exists, so it must serve some important purpose. What is it? 
 The supposition behind this relies heavily on the term “effectiveness,” which I 
do not find very clear at all. What does it mean, after all, to be effective? Reasoning 
evolved, we are told because it really, really helped human communication. Well, I like 
reasoning as much as the next person, and it is quite helpful, but we must remember, and 
Mercier and Sperber would, I believe, concur, that it occurs first and foremost in situa-
tions where there is disagreement and doubt. This leads me to raise the question of 
whether or not humans, in a primitive state, benefit from disagreement. Disagreement and 
its ensuing conflict leads, as history clearly demonstrates, to dire results ranging from the 
Peloponnesian wars to 9/11. Wouldn’t we be better off without disagreement? Yes, we 
might not have as much technical advantage as we do, but who can be sure? Perhaps 
Popper was wrong, and agreement could be a driving force of its own with only apparent 
failure as a modifier. We’ve never, after all, really given agreement a chance. 
 Consider the movie, The Invention of Lying (Gervais and Robinson 2009). In this 
fantasy society no one speaks anything but the truth. Not because they are incapable of it, 
but because communication just did not evolve that way. Therefore anything anyone says is 
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taken as true. Mark, played by Ricky Gervais, discovers that he is capable of speaking 
something that is not true, and mayhem ensues. When, for example, he says to a friend, by 
way of a test, “I’m a one armed Polish astronaut,” the friend asks what date is the blast off. 
The society is portrayed as bland and uncreative, but there is no real conflict because there 
is no disagreement. So one can question the evolutionary value of reasoning that arises 
primarily as a function of disagreement. We might have been better off without it. 
 Santibañez does a very good job of presenting a new and intriguing theory that 
still, somehow, manages to miss a great number of points generally accepted in Argu-
mentation Theory. I find myself in agreement with his approach to evolutionary argu-
ment, and, so, have no disagreements. I agree with him that the evolutionary theory wants 
inspection, but also agree that there are serious issues that need to explored. 
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